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approach, the concept is not unknown to the courts,38 and has been
approved in Virginia and the District of Columbia. 3D
Thus it appears that many of the problems in this area are self-
created, in that the courts fail to determine whether they are dealing
with a property settlement or a support agreement. It is suggested
that this determination can and should be made at any one of sev-
eral stages in the proceedings. First, the parties should state in the
agreement whether it is a property settlement or support agree-
ment. While such a statement is not binding on the courts, it will
be given weight if reasonable 4 0 Secondly, the trial court in the divorce
action should make the decision when it has the benefit of the testi-
mony of the parties. 41 Thirdly, if that court fails to make the de-
termination, the trial court in an action on the agreement should
adjudicate the issue. If the case reaches the appellate level without a
sound decision on the point, the appellate court should make its own
decision as to the nature of the agreement. Irrespective of the stage
at which the determination is made, it is submitted that it must be
made, for'a clear decision as to this initial problem will simplify the
decision of the remaining issues.
HUGH V. WHIm, JR.
THE THIRD DEGREE AND COERCED CONFESSIONS
IN STATE COURTS
It has long been recognized that law enforcement officers and
prosecuting attorneys frequently employ the third degree' or Star
Chamber tactics in securing confessions from persons suspected of
participation in crimes.2 In order to protect accused persons, the gen-
,"The most striking example of a contract involving independent clauses is a
lease. See, 3 Williston, Contracts § 89o (rev. ed. 1936).
*Rogers v. Rogers, 203 F.2d 61 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Gloth v. Gloth, 154 Va. 511,
153 S.E. 879, 89, (193o).
'°Puckett v. Puckett, 21 Cal. 2d 833, 136 P.2d 1 (L943); Pearman v. Pearman,
1o4 Cal. App. 2d 250, 231 P.2d 1o (Dist. Ct. App. 1951).
"1In Michigan, a rule of court requires the judiciary to separate the support and
property settlement provisions before incorporation. Mich. Ct. R. 51(5).
"'In its original conception, the term 'third degree' did not have its present
sinister meaning. In studying the etymology of the term we find that it is merely a
step in the arrest and conviction of the criminal. Thus, the arrest was the first de-
gree, the incarceration in jail was the second degree, and the Preliminary examina-
tion was the third degree." Report of Committee on Lawless Enforcement of Law,
i Am. J. of Police Science, 579 n.9 (193 o ) (emphasis added); 3 Wigmore, Evidence
§ 851 (3 d ed. 1940).
-Report of Committee on Lawless Enforcement of Law, i Am. J. of Police Science,
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eral rule developed that involuntary or coerced confessions were in-
admissible as evidence in criminal cases.3 While it was agreed that
the exclusion of such confessions was desirable, there was inconsistency
in the application of the rule4 because the choice between various
tests of voluntariness was left to the states.5
In the 1936 landmark case of Brown v. Mississippi G the United
States Supreme Court extended the application of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment to strike down convictions based
upon alleged involuntary confessions obtained by means of physical
force and violence.7 Four years later, the Supreme Court unanimously
held in Chambers v. Florida- that confessions made after long periods
of questioning under "circumstances calculated to inspire terror" were
involuntary and therefore also barred by the fourteenth amendment.9
By thus recognizing that coercion can be mental, as well as physical,
the Court greatly expanded the application of the due process clause
to involuntary confessions.
In the recent case of Blackburn v. Alabama,'0 the Supreme Court
again applied the principles established by its earlier decisions. In
1944 the petitioner, Blackburn, was discharged from the armed forces
575 (1930). It is suggested that the third degree is used everywhere in the United
States. For excellent discussions of methods used in extracting confessions and the
historical development of tests to determine whether such confessions are admissible,
see Note, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 617 (ig3o) and Note, 8 Va. L. Rev. 527 (1922).
"Lester v. State, 17o Ala. 36, 54 So. 175 (191o); People v. Rogers, 303 Ill. 578,
t36 N.E. 470 (1922); Pinckard v. State, 62 Tex. Crim. 602, 138 S.W. 6o (1911). Some
courts developed the practice of holding confessions in abeyance until all persons
present when the confession was elicited had been examined regarding the circum-
stances at the time the confession was made. People v. Spranger, 314 Ill. 602, 145
N.E. 706 (1924); People v. Rogers, supra. Note that these cases were decided prior
to 1936 and were based purely on evidence, rather than constitutional, considerations.
(This distinction is explained more fully in the text.)
'Lester v. State, supra note 3; State v. Thomas, 193 Iowa 1004, 188 N.W. 689,
695 (1922); Pinckard v. State, supra note 3.
1Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278, 285 (1936); 3 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 823, 824 (3d ed. 1940). See note 45 infra.
6297 U.S. 278 (1936).
7Comment, Evidence-Invalidity Under Due Process of Convictions Based on
Confessions Obtained by Duress, 5 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 243 (1948).
8309 U.S. 227 (1940).
°Petitioners, ignorant Negro farmers, were questioned individually over a five-
day period, ending in an all-night interrogation, by policemen and citizens "who
held their very lives-so far as the ignorant petitioners could know-in the bal-
ance." Id. at 238. Petitioners were not allowed to see counsel, friends, or relatives at
any time. In rendering its opinion, the court said that, "to permit human lives to be
forfeited upon confessions thus obtained would make the constitutional require-
ment of due process of law a meaningless symbol." Id. at 24o.
10361 U.S. 199 (1960).
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and declared permanently disabled by a psychosis. He received treat-
ment in a Veterans Administration hospital until 1948, at which time
he was discharged from the hospital because of his failure to return
from an authorized absence. Shortly thereafter, petitioner was ar-
rested on suspicion of robbery; he subsequently confessed to par-
ticipation in the crime. The confession was obtained after Blackburn
had been interrogated for eight or nine hours in a small room by as
many as three officers at a time without the aid or comfort of counsel,
friends, or relatives. Prior to the trial, petitioner was declared insane
and committed to the Alabama State Hospital. The commitment was
based upon examinations conducted by a panel of physicians and the
finding of a lunacy commission. Blackburn remained in the hospital
until 1952 when he was declared mentally competent to stand trial. The
admission of the 1948 confession into evidence," over petitioner's ob-
jection, resulted in his conviction, which was affirmed by the Ala-
bama Court of Appeals.' 2 The Supreme Court, in considering the
"totality of the circumstances"' 3 and relying upon its previous decis-
ions,' 4 reversed, holding that the confession was involuntary and, as
such, inadmissible. 15
It has been repeatedly recognized that the due process clause re-
quires "that state action.., shall be consistent with the fundamental
principles of liberty and justice ... ,"1 and as stated in Lisenba v.
California:
1
"The aim of the requirement of due process [with regard to
the admissibility of confessions] is not to exclude presump-
tively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness
in the use of evidence, whether true or false.
"* * * Such unfairness exists when a coerced confession
is used as a means of obtaining a verdict of guilt."' 8
uId. at 2oo n.i. The only other significant evidence was circumstantial and
probably of little probative value by itself.
"2Blackburn v. State, 1o9 So. 2d 736 (Ala. 1958).
"Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197 (1957). Accord, Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342
U.S. 55, 65 (1951); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 53 (1949).
"The Supreme Court had reversed two state court convictions because of
evidence that the confessors were possessed of "[a] history of emotional instability,"
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 322 (1959), and "low mentality, if not mentally
ill," Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 196 (1957), in addition to other circumstances
weighing against the voluntariness of the confessions used in evidence. See also
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
2361 U.S. at 208.
"Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926). Accord, Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 54 (1947).
'-314 U.S. 219 (1941).
1d. at 236-S7.
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With this in mind, the Supreme Court has, with but few exceptions,' 9
uniformly adhered to its rulings in Brown and Chambers that the
admission into evidence of a coerced confession completely vitiates a
state court conviction, notwithstanding the presence of other evidence
sufficient to warrant submission of the case to the jury.20 For a confes-
sion to be admissible in evidence, it must have been voluntarily made,
and if the confession is the product of "sustained pressure" by officials,
it is not a free choice statement.21 To be voluntary, however, it need
not necessarily be volunteered; 22 for as stated by the court in Lyons
v. Oklahoma,-2 3 "the voluntary or involuntary character of a confes-
sion is determined by a conclusion as to whether the accused, at the
time he confesses, is in possession of 'mental freedom' to confess to
or deny a suspected participation in a crime."24
Questioning a suspect is, of course, permissible, and the fact that
it is done while the suspect is under arrest or in the custody of police
officials does not of itself constitute a violation of the fourteenth
amendment.2 5 Although the primary emphasis in determining whether
a confession has been coerced is apparently upon the length of the
interrogation period,26 the test advanced by the Supreme Court is a
consideration of the "totality of the circumstances" 27 appearing from
'"314 U.S. 219 (1941). This is one of the rare occasions in which the Supreme
Court, while applying the recognized test, found that the confession in question
was not coerced. The Court felt that a lapse of eleven days between the last inter-
rogation and the confession was sufficient to nullify the coercive quality of the
interrogations. See also Thomas v. Arizona, 256 U.S. 39o (1958), wherein the Court
adopted similar reasoning in refusing to reverse a state court conviction obtained
by using a confession in evidence.
nSpano v. New York, 36o U.S. 315, 324 (1959); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 56o,
567-68 (1958); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 475 (1953); Stroble v. California, 343
U.S. 181, 190 (1952); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 63 (1951); Haley v. Ohio,
332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 404 (1945); Lyons v.
Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 597 n.i (1943).
nWatts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949)-
=Ibid.
"322 U.S. 596 (1944)-
2'Id. at 602. See also Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 56, 561 (1954); Ashcraft v. Ten-
nessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154 (1954); Hysler v. Florida 315 U.S. 411, 413 (1941).
"nBrown v. Allen, 3.t4 U-S. 443, 476 (1953); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219,
239-41 (1941); Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1, 14 (1924).
"The most commonly used method [to coerce a confession] is persistent ques-
tioning, continuing hour after hour, sometimes by relays of officers. It has been
known since i5oo at least that the deprivation of sleep is the most effective -torture
and certain to produce any confession desired." Report of Committee on Lawless
Enforcement of Law, i Am. J. of Police Science 575, 580 (1930). See Ziang Sung Wan
v. United States, 266 U.S. 1, 69 (1924).
2"See note 13 supra.
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the undisputed facts in the record.28 In examining the facts of a par-
ticular case,29 the court considers such circumstances as unlawful de-
tention,30 systematic persistence of interrogation, 31 length of periods
of questioning,32 failure to advise the suspect of his right to remain
silent,3 3 absence' of counsel or friends,3 4 mental capacity of the sus-
pect,35 his character3 6 and his age.aT These enumerated factors are by
way of example only, and it is impossible to state as a rule that any
single circumstance or combination will render a confession invol-
untary. In realizing that the scope of its inquiry into each particu-
lar case is limited to the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case,
the Supreme Court said in Stein v. New York:3
8
"The limits in any case depend upon a weighing of the cir-
cumstances of pressure against the power of resistance of the
person confessing. What would be overpowering to the weak
of will or mind might be utterly ineffective against an experi-
enced criminal."3 9
Since the due process clause has been made applicable to the use
of involuntary confessions in state criminal cases, what had previously
been an evidence problem has been turned into a constitutional prob-
lem. Nevertheless, while examining the problem from the constitu-
tional standpoint, the evidence considerations are not ignored. Histor-
ically, coerced confessions were excluded at the state trial court level
'Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 435 (1958); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556,
558 (1954); Stroble v. California, 343 U-S. 181, 190 (1952); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342
U.S. 55, 63 (1951); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 52 (1949); Malinski v. New York,
324 U.S. 401, 404 (1945).
'Gallegos v. Nebraska, supra note 28 at 65.
'Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62, 63 (1949). While officers who unlawfully
detain prisoners before taking them before a magistrate may be punished for a mis-
demeanor, such detention or delay does not of itself render a confession coerced.
Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 234-35
(1941). Cf. the McNabb-Mallory rule obtaining in the federal courts, note 44 infra
and accompanying text.
31
Driver v. State, 201 Md. 25, 92 A.2d 570, 572 (1952).
32Ibid.
13Ibid. See Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62, 64 (1949).
31Driver v. State, 2o Md. 25, 92 A.2d 570, 572 (1952). See Spano v. New York,
360 U.S. 315, 325 (1959); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932).
17See note 15 supra.
"Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68, 71 (1949)-
",Driver v. State, 201 Md. 25, 92 A.2d 570, 572 (1952). In Haley v. Ohio, 332 US.
596 (1948) the court relied heavily upon the youthfulness (fifteen years old) of the
petitioner in reversing the state court conviction. The Haley case is commented
upon in 5 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 243 (1948).
'"346 U.S. 156 (1953).
31Id. at 185.
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either because they were testimonially untrustworthy40 or because of
a policy consideration that a prisoner is privileged against making
statements under coercive circumstances, 41 whether such statement is
true or not.42 Prior to the Brown decision, a determination of the
evidence issue by the highest court of the state was final. Since Brown
the United States Supreme Court applies its own policy considerations
in determining whether, under given circumstances, the petitioner's
constitutionally protected rights have been violated.
43
In recent years, the confessions which have most frequently been
characterized as coerced are those made in situations involving some
period of illegal detention or unnecessary delay in arraignment. In
this particular area of the general problem, the federal courts apply a
pure evidence rule, the so-called McNabb-Mallory rule,44 which comes
into effect when Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
has been violated. Rule 5(a) requires that arrested individuals be
brought before a committing magistrate without unnecessary or un-
reasonable delay. Thus, all confessions obtained during such delays
are rendered inadmissible without reaching the reliability and con-
stitutional considerations. This rule has not been made applicable to
criminal proceedings in state courts, 45 although apparently there is
hope among some of the Supreme Court Justices that eventually it
will be.
46
In light of holdings that the admission of coerced confessions viti-
ates a state court conviction regardless of the presence of other evidence
establishing a prima facie case, it is submitted that the Supreme Court
'03 Wigmore, Evidence § 822 (d ed. 1940) .
"McCormick, Evidence § 75 (1954).
"3Ibid.
'Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U-S. 55, 61 (1951); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S.
219, 238 (1941).
"Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318
U.S. 332 (1943). The development and present status of the rule is discussed in
Hogan and Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue, 47
Geo. L. J. 1 (958).
'Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 64 (1951). There are various tests applied
by courts to determine: "Was the inducement such that there was any fair risk
of a false confession?" 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 82.4 (3 d ed. 1940). The fourteenth
amendment leaves the choice of tests to the state, but adoption of a rule does not
preclude inquiry in a particular case to determine whether the application of the
rule deprives the prisoner of life or liberty without due process of law. Lisbena v.
California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
'See the dissenting opinion of Justices Black and Douglas in Stroble v. Califor-
nia, 343 U.S. 181, 203 (1952), and Gallegos v. Nebraska, supra note 45 at 73, and the
concurring opinions of Justice Douglas in the following cases: Watts v. Indiana, 338
U.S. 49, 56 (1949); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62, 66 (1949); Harris v. South Car-
olina, 338 U.S. 68, 71 (1949).
